Introduction
Human-non-human chimeras and hybrids have existed within the human imagination for thousands of years; for example, mythological stories of the Minotaur, of Centaurs, of Sirens and mermaids have flourished within human society throughout the ages. However, in recent years, the ability of humans to create new and complex biological entities by manipulating genes and transferring cells between animal species has created a new bioethical problem. In the early 1980’s, researchers at Harvard developed the oncomouse, a mouse that is highly susceptible to developing tumours.[1] They inserted a human gene into a mouse and patented it for use as a model for human cancers in order to carry out research into the disease. From that point onwards a whole plethora of transgenic experiments have been carried out in which genetic material or whole cells have been transferred between human beings and non-human animals. This has raised-up many new ethical, philosophical and theological questions that society now has to try to answer.
The questions that loom within the theological field are, to what extent can human-non-human chimeras be considered to be made in the image of God? If they contain a significant percentage of human material, what should their moral and ethical status be? Finally, according to the Christian point of view, should these entities even be created?
In order to answer the questions above, a number of areas will need to be explored. Therefore, in chapter 1 the scientific field of the subject area will be examined. It will be important to survey the current state of affairs and expound a little of the science behind the creation of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids in order to provide a solid foundation in order to answer the above questions. Chapter 2 will explore the idea of human personhood and will focus upon the Judaeo-Christian concept of imago Dei in order to provide an understanding of what it means to be a human being. The last chapter, chapter three, will explore the status of non-human animals and go on to deal with the moral and ethical status of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids. It is hoped that the three chapters may inform one another and lead to a satisfactory conclusion at the end of this dissertation.
Before the chapters can be looked at, my methodology must be examined and a survey of current literature on the subject must be performed. This is an important part of the study, as it will allow me to provide the reader with an insight into the current academic field surrounding the issue of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids.
I have chosen to look at human-non-human chimeras and hybrids because I think that it is an area of bioethics that is currently neglected, especially by theologians. I have seen many books and articles looking at abortion and euthanasia from a Christian perspective but not that many that deal with transgenics. As shall be seen just a little further, on, there is in fact hardly anything written on the subject of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids from a Christian perspective. The main problem that arose when writing this dissertation was that the scientific and political spheres concerning the creation of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids are constantly changing; therefore, I have only been able to provide a snapshot of the current fields as they stand today.[2] Nevertheless, I think that this study is highly relevant to contemporary bioethics and is an area that needs to be explored from a Christian viewpoint.
The nature of my study has led me to carry out only theoretical research, that is, empirical research would not have been appropriate to carry out. Therefore, I have had to consult a wide range of written materials in order to construct the chapters that are to follow. The first thing that I consulted were some primers on Christian bioethics[3]; although I have studied the area before I thought that it would be prudent to refresh myself upon the application of theological concepts to the field of bioethics. However, when it came to finding works that related expressly to the field of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids in relation to imago Dei I found very little material at all.
The most relevant material to the field that I found related to the moral and ethical status of hybrids and chimeras was:
· An article by Disilvestro titled ‘A neglected solution to the problem of the metaphysical and moral status of the human animal chimera’. Although the title sounded promising, I found the article to be unnecessarily complicated by unneeded ‘philosophical equations’ which tried to argue the case that human-non-human chimeras and hybrids could be equated to the incarnation of Christ. He states that ‘Just as it makes sense to say that Jesus could be fully human and fully divine, it makes sense to say that the chimera could be fully human and fully bovine.’[4] Although I agree with the idea that something can be ‘human’ as well as something other than Homo sapiens, I do not agree with his reasoning.
· An issue of the American Journal of Bioethics which contained an article, titled ‘Crossing the Species Boundaries’ by Baylis and Scott-Robert, looked at the moral status of chimeras and hybrids. Apart from a very short section about ‘playing God’, there was not any involvement of the Christian tradition.
Aside from these two articles, I have not really come across very much that looks at the moral/ethical status of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids from a theological perspective in any detail. Therefore, I have had to apply my own understanding of theological concepts such as imago Dei to the issue of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids in order to come to some kind of conclusion to the study. This is the reason that chapter 2 has to be devoted to the subject of imago Dei as it is vital to the study to come to an understanding of human personhood before the ethical and moral status of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids can be assessed.
Lastly, I have had a problem with the term ‘human’; I have come to understand this not as necessarily referring to the species Homo sapiens, rather I have discovered, through reflecting on imago Dei that it could easily be bestowed upon other beings. Consequently, the reader should read the term ‘human’ as referring to Homo sapiens in chapters 1 and 2 and towards the end of chapter 3 it should be read as transcending genetic boundaries.
Chapter 1
An Overview of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids.
It is vitally important from the outset, in order to comprehend the following chapters of this study, to have a clear understanding of what is meant by the terms ‘chimera’ and ‘hybrid’ and to understand a small amount of the science involved in creating these entities. These words may mean very different things to different people; to the scholar of classical literature and mythology a chimera is a mythological creature[5], to the farmer, hybrids are the result of selective breeding to create new hardier stocks and to the geneticists these words hold much promise in pushing forward the boundaries of humankind’s ability to create.
In coming to an understanding of chimeras and hybrids the Scottish Council on Human Bioethics[6] report Embryonic, Fetal [sic] and Post-natal Animal-Human Mixtures: An Ethical Discussion[7] is instrumental. According to this report, a chimera can be understood as a mixture ‘of cells, tissue and organs from two different biological entities whether or not they are of the same species.’[8] It is interesting to note that chimeras can occur in nature; a common one being lichen which is a mixture of algae and fungi[9]. A much more unusual case of chimerism is that of “Jane”[10] who is a tetragametic chimera, which is ‘a person whose body is made up from two genetically distinct lines of cells derived from a total of four gametes- eggs and sperm’[11]. She is a mixture of two non-identical twin sisters who joined in the womb to become one individual. Though cases such as “Jane” may provide many questions for theological debate concerning the nature of personhood and imago Dei, this study is concerned with a different type of entity, that of the artificially created human-non-human chimera.
When defining a human-non-human chimera it is important to realise that there are two fundamental types. These are pre-natal and post-natal. The SCHB defined pre-natal human-non-human chimeras as:
● A human embryo or fetus [sic] into which at least one cell of a non-human life form has been introduced; or
● An animal embryo or fetus [sic] into which at least one cell of a human life form has been introduced[12]
A hybrid is defined as:
● A human ovum that has been fertilized by sperm of a non-human life form;
● An ovum of a non-human life form that has been fertilized by human sperm;
● A human ovum into which the nucleus of a cell of a non-human life form has been introduced;
● An ovum of a non-human life form into which the nucleus of a human cell has been introduced;
● A human ovum or an ovum of a non-human life form that otherwise contains chromosomes from both a human being and a non-human life form.[13]
These definitions, which are based on Canadian law, make it clear that only one foreign cell needs to be introduced into the host being in order to create a chimera. However, logically a human foetus with one non-human animal cell contained within it is an entirely different entity compared with a human foetus that contains a large percentage of animal cells. A human foetus containing one chimpanzee cell is unlikely to be different from a normal, non-chimeric, human foetus at any level. However a human foetus that has fifty percent of its’ body made up of chimpanzee cells may behave and look very differently from an average human being when it is born. In addition, a human-non-human chimera that is the result of xenotransplantation, e.g. a human containing new heart valves from a pig, is very unlikely to behave or to be considered different from the rest of humanity. Similarly, with hybrids, a non-human animal with one human gene in it is very different to a non-human animal with forty percent human DNA contained within its cells. An important question to consider now is, to what extent have human-non-human chimeras and hybrids been created to date? It may be useful to separate science-fact from science fiction, whilst bearing in mind that often today’s science fiction becomes tomorrows scientific fact.
The scientific landscape is constantly changing and there is no doubt that any experiments listed here will be outdated rapidly; therefore rather than give a detailed account of the scientific experiments that have been carried out,[14] it will be more beneficial here to give a brief overview of the types of experiment that have occurred so far. Examples are as follows:
- In the past, before ICSI[15], a common hybrid embryo was that of the human-hamster. Used in fertility testing, the Hamster Egg Penetration Test (HEPT test) was a way of examining the viability of any particular human male’s sperm. In this test, a hamster egg is stripped of its zona pellucida, its outer membrane, and then mixed with human sperm. Fertile sperm can penetrate the egg resulting in a human-hamster hybrid; this must be destroyed at the two-cell stage.[16]
- In 2001 researchers in
- In 2003 eleven mouse embryos were injected with human embryonic stem cells that were tagged with a fluorescent protein These mice were then transferred to surrogate mice mothers and five were carried to term. The five post-natal mice contained human cells in various organs including their hearts and livers.[18].
- More recently, sheep with livers consisting of up to forty percent of human cells were created by Esmail Zanjani.[19]
- Human stem cells have also been implanted into foetal monkeys, although they were destroyed before birth they showed evidence of the cells being incorporated into their brains.[20]
- In 2004 pig-human chimeras were produced which contained human cells, pig cells and hybrid cells that had formed themselves in the pig.[21]
Taking into account the sort of experimentation, cited above, that has been carried out on human-non-human chimeras and hybrids, it should be obvious that it will be a reasonable while before scientists are able to create 'sophisticated' blends of human and non-human cells or genetic material that could survive birth and grow into mature beings.[22] An example of a 'sophisticated' blend could be the so-called 'humanzee', which is a currently theoretical human-chimpanzee hybrid. Although the technology is limited now it is still important to discuss the implications of these theoretical, ‘sophisticated’ human-non-human blends. If the positive and negative aspects of the creation of human-non-human hybrids and chimeras are not discussed thoroughly, society will end up deprived of any benefits of this technology or might find itself having to deal with illicit creations whose identity and moral status would be dubious and would not fall under any current legal regulations.
Already society as a whole is confused by the issue of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids with many documents using the terms ‘hybrid’ and ‘chimera’ incorrectly and with many believing that current technology can create sophisticated mixed entities. In December 2006 the UK
The Government will propose that the creation of hybrid and chimera embryos in vitro should not be allowed. However, the Government also proposes that the law will contain a power enabling regulations to set out circumstances in which the creation of hybrid and chimera embryos in vitro may in future be allowed under licence, for research purposes only.[24]
In response to this proposed ban Mark Henderson, Science editor at the Times newspaper, claimed that ‘They [the government] have been spooked by the outcome of an unrepresentative public consultation, and by misleading and hysterical reporting of research.’[25] On the 10th January 2007, forty-five ‘experts’ on the subject, including the president of the Royal Society, sent a letter to the Times newspaper urging the HFEA[26] to back the creation of hybrid embryos. They claimed the ‘potential benefits to human health’[27] were good enough reasons to adopt a supportive policy concerning human-non-human hybrid embryo research. These benefits included:
being able to grow stem cells with specific genetic abnormalities, improving the efficiency of therapeutic cloning techniques and establishing cell lines for the testing of new treatments for diseases such as motor neuron disease, Alzheimer’s disease and spinal muscular atrophy[28]
This brouhaha is a prime example of media hype influencing public opinion and of the scientific community trying to convince the sceptics that a controversial technique is beneficial and must be used for the greater good of humankind. Debates will continue to rage in the media and within the scientific academic community[29]; however it is strikingly clear that what is needed is a debate concerning the possible consequences of the creation of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids with educated input from many different academic disciplines, including theology.
Recent experiments such as Sheng’s therapeutic cloned human embryos[30], in which rabbit oocytes were stripped of their chromosomes and replaced with human DNA, mostly fall under the debate of whether it is ethical to create human embryos[31] for embryonic stem (ES) cell research. Nevertheless, the germ line of the species Homo sapiens is altered when animal oocytes are used in therapeutic cloning to create ES cell lines, even if the resultant embryo contains a near negligible amount of animal DNA. In a similar manner, human-non-human chimeras can be seen as a violation of the natural created order, no matter how few cells are transferred across the species. This of course leaves many possibly beneficial avenues of research in a moral ‘grey area’.
This ‘grey area’ needs to be reviewed and discussed in order to determine what research should or should not be permissible. However, the problem with assessing the moral status of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids that exist in a pre-fourteen day embryonic state is that, for many, the jury is still out as to whether a full genetic member of the species Homo sapiens in a pre-fourteen day embryonic state deserves the full moral status, and the legal rights that accompany that status, that is ascribed to a post-natal human being[32]. Therefore, it would seem fruitless to try to determine the moral status of a human-non-human entity by treading the same ground as those who have tried to determine the moral status of a genetic human being in an embryonic state. Bearing this in mind it might be more productive to take the debate a step further and look at the potential (currently theoretical) result of experimenting with human-non-human mixtures. By examining the moral status of a theoretical, mature, post-natal, ‘sophisticated’ blend of a human-non-human chimera or hybrid, it may be possible to assess what its moral and ethical status in society would be and therefore inform the debate in a different way.
Chapter 2
Constructing an understanding of the concept of imago Dei.
It would seem that a fundamental part of the debate over the creation of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids is the question: what constitutes a human being? It is evident that human beings are different from the rest of the non-human animal kingdom; Homo sapiens are a genetically distinct species and have many attributes that cannot be ascribed to any other non-human animal. The problem is not determining whether human beings are essentially different to other non-human animals; there would be no cause for concern regarding the creation of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids if humans were essentially the same as non-human animals, rather the question that looms prominently in the debate is ‘how are human beings different?’ This, of course, is not a question that is particular to the field of bioethics; it is an age-old question that has taken many forms, indeed Jürgen Moltmann claims that:
A cow is always simply a cow. It does not ask, ‘What is a cow? Who am I? Only man asks such questions, and indeed clearly has to ask them about himself and his being. This is his question.[33]
In order to come to an understanding about the moral and social status of a human-non-human chimera/hybrid it is crucial to determine first what a human being is.
There are many different approaches to this question of being that could be undertaken. Humans can be understood as genetically and physically different, psychologically different, and sociologically different to other non-human animals. They can also be understood to be more rational, more creative, more reflective and more moral than other creatures. All of these aspects[34] are important in building an understanding of humanity; however, they can be looked at from many different angles and points of view.
It must be said now that a Christian vision of personhood must be different to that of the secular community.[35] A vast proportion of the debate surrounding the creation of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids so far has been devoted to a secular, scientific viewpoint; this is understandable, as the debate has emanated from the scientific communities who are trying to create the mixed entities. However, there is an important Jewish and Christian concept that is of key importance for understanding personhood in a Christian capacity. It is an idea that could be very beneficial in representing a much-needed non-secular, Christian voice in the debate. Imago Dei is a key part of understanding the nature of being human and of creating a Christian vision of personhood; it is a belief that has been explored for thousands of years and it finds its roots in the Hebrew Scriptures.[36]
Middleton states that:
For nearly two thousand years the Christian tradition has singled out Genesis 1:26-27 for special attention. These biblical verses constitute the locus classicus of the doctrine of imago Dei, the notion that human beings are made in God’s “image” and “likeness”.[37]
He is quite right in asserting those two verses as being an incredibly important part of the concept of imago Dei, for they have provided theologians throughout the centuries with infinitely complex questions, such as, how are humans made in God’s image and likeness? What does it mean to be made in the image of God? What characteristics have been bestowed on humanity due to their having been created in God’s likeness? These questions cannot be answered unequivocally as each person brings a unique insight to the discussion by virtue of their personal experiences and reflections. For it is through dialogue with other human beings and by an engagement with the Christian scriptures and traditions that an understanding of the rich, deep, concept of imago Dei may come about and most importantly be refreshed and discovered anew by subsequent generations.
The concept of imago Dei can be roughly divided into two main broad viewpoints, the ‘substantive’ and the ‘relational’ models of understanding[38]. The substantive model looks at the question, How are human beings like God but unlike the rest of the animal kingdom? The important element to this model is the idea that human beings share particular characteristics with God, i.e. physical or spiritual capacities such as intellect or language. On the other hand, the relational model argues that ‘man emerges as truly man, as a category distinct from both God and the animals, only in relation to God.’[39] Through this lens of understanding, it is only through having a relationship with God and with other people that a member of the species Homo sapiens can be considered a full human being.
David Cairns, author of The Image of God in Man, claims that ‘in all Christian writers up to Aquinas we find the image of God conceived as man’s power of reason.’[40] Middleton comments that Cairns St. Augustine
We must discover, in man's rational or intellectual soul, an image of its Creator fixed immortally in its immortal nature. We are able to speak only of a qualified immortality of the soul, for when the soul is deprived of that bliss which constitutes its true life; there is a death of the soul. It is called immortal because even in great misery it never stops living a certain kind of life. Likewise, although at some time reason and understanding may be inactive in it and at other times seem diminished or great, the human soul is never anything but rational and intellectual; and consequently, if its being made in God's image witnesses its power to exercise reason and intellect in order to understand and contemplate God, we may be certain that being so great and marvellous a creature from the very beginning that image always remains, whether it be so faded that almost no image is left, whether it be obscured and defaced or bright and beautiful.[42]
According to St. Augustine
There are, of course, many other characteristics of God that might be understood as being mirrored by humans. Human beings have the ability to create, to use complex language, to have moral and ethical codes, to think abstractly etcetera. Unfortunately, due to a constraint of space these issues cannot be looked at in depth in this dissertation, as doing so would require a whole book to be written on the subject.[46] Therefore, the above sketch of the substantive model of imago Dei will have to suffice.
The second model, which has become the more popular construct, is the relational one. Van Huysteen argues that Karl Barth is ‘certainly the most influential theologian on this view’[47]; in his series of systematic theology Church
Man can and always will be man before God and among his fellows only as he is man in relationship to woman and in relationship to man. And he is one or the other he is man.[48]
Here, an interesting point is raised, that of the idea that human beings can be defined as being human not because of any substantive characteristic that are held by them but rather because of their relationships. The relationships that a human has may be understood as being either vertical or horizontal; in the vertical relationship human beings commune with God and in horizontal ones human beings interact with other human beings.[49] Phillip Heffner presents a very brief overview of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s thought on the relational understanding of imago Dei[50], this can be further summarised as follows:
· Pannenberg believed that humans become persons when they acknowledge themselves to be in the presence of a personal God. He rejected the idea that human beings projected their own anthropomorphic qualities onto God. For Christians, the personal God that they are in the presence of is a God in relationship; by virtue of existing in a trinity each person of the Godhead is defined by its relationship with the other two persons.
· Human persons are grounded in a network of relationships with other people. Through being open to others and entering into relationships with them, human personhood is fostered.
These views provide two important elements in forming an understanding of imago Dei. First, the importance of the trinity in the subject is highlighted and second the fact that humans need to exist in relationships with other human beings is brought to light.
The subject of the trinity as a component in the concept of imago Dei is a key part of constructing a truly Christian vision of human personhood. Unfortunately it is an incredibly complex field and cannot be given the justice it deserves in such as short space, nevertheless, it must be touched upon, albeit, in a very succinct manner[51]. Stripped away to the bare minimum; the role of the doctrine of the trinity in the concept of imago Dei could be summed up as follows. Because the Godhead exists in a communion of mutual love and each person of the trinity is defined by their relationship to the others[52], human beings who are created in the image of a triune-God can only have their personhood formed through having relationships with God and fellow human beings.
Relationship with others can be seen as a central part of being human and forming personhood. Indeed this vital part of being human was summed up well by John Donne in his celebrated writing Meditation XVII in which he says that:
No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were: any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for whom the bells tolls; it tolls for thee.[53]
The idea that no person can stand alone in the world and is tied-up with the whole of human society, captured so eloquently by Donne, provides the Christian vision of personhood with another way of remaining all-embracing and inclusive of the whole of humanity. If relationships are an integral part of forming personhood then all of human society is included. Concerning relationships with fellow human beings, everybody affects others and is in turn affected by those around them; even those who have very severe learning disabilities remain in communion with others. Concerning relationships with God it can be said that[54]:
- Christians remain in communion with God.
- Peoples of other faiths, at the very least, strive to commune with the divine.
- By denying Gods existence, atheists effectively make the decision to turn their back on God, it is however a position in relation to God and there is still a relationship, albeit a negative one on the atheists part.
In short, when creating a Christian vision of human personhood that is based upon the concept of imago Dei, the key issue that must be present is inclusiveness. A truly Christian conception of personhood cannot marginalise any members of human society, as when this happens people inevitably are treated as sub-human, prime examples of this are the European slave trade in which black people were treated as chattels and the Holocaust in which Jewish people among other groups were destroyed like animals. A Christian vision of what it means to be human can only be properly constructed if the relational model of imago Dei, supplemented by the substantive viewpoint, is kept in mind.
Chapter 3
An exploration of the moral and ethical status of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids.
‘This time I will burn out all the animal, this time I will make a rational creature of my own. After all, what is ten years? Man has been a hundred thousand in the making.’[55]- Dr. Moreau.
In chapter two, the Christian concept of imago Dei was explored and it was determined that a truly Christian vision of human personhood needed to be inclusive and embrace the whole of humanity. The next question that arises is how far can human personhood, as informed by imago Dei, be extended to beings that are not fully Homo sapiens? This chapter will explore the possible personhood of a theoretical sophisticated, mature, post-natal human-non-human chimera/hybrid. It will be assumed that the being has sufficient intelligence and reason to be able to be self-aware, have an awareness of past and future and be able to use reasonably complex language in order to communicate[56]. In order to determine the moral and ethical status of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids it will first be necessary to explore briefly the status that has been given to non-human animals.
Immanuel Kant states that ‘Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. That end is Man’.[57] In this statement, Kant places animals clearly at the service of human beings; by stating that animals are not self-conscious, he negates the need to bestow any rights or moral status on them. He does continue to say that humans must be kind to animals as ‘tender feelings towards dumb animals develop humane feelings towards mankind.’[58] He reasons that an inhumane action by a human being towards an animal leads that person to become inhumane towards other human beings. Therefore, according to Kant, it is important to practice benevolence towards animals not because the animals deserve respect and humane treatment but to foster goodwill towards human beings; the animals act as a means to a human end. Similarly he believes that vivisectionists, who use live animals to experiment on, may act very cruelly, however, he thinks that their ‘aim is praiseworthy’[59] and that their cruelty can be justified as they only experiment on animals in order to benefit human beings.
Kant’s view has been very influential and can be seen taken up by modern scholars. In his book, Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective, Leahy uses the model of a farm animal to show how animals are, in agreement with Kant, there for human beings benefit.[60] He claims that if a farm animal chose to eat ‘cow parsley with apparent avidity’[61] yet subsequently begun to lose weight, the farmer would stop the animal from eating it. If the animal then gained weight by eating a different food and did not show overt signs of suffering the farmer would not be harming the animal by disallowing it to eat its preferred food. Leahy states that ‘for animals in the absence of suffering, ignorance is bliss.’[62]
The above viewpoint has serious implications for the rights and the moral status that might be bestowed upon non-human animals by human beings. If the argument that non-human animals are merely means to human ends; it can never be said that animals have a personhood akin to human persons, for human persons are afforded respect and are granted many rights and freedoms. For example, in the normal course of things human beings must give their consent before being experimented on in order to benefit medical research; however millions of animals are bred for experimentation each year and do not have the ability to step-down from often painful research techniques. There are many who oppose this human-benefit oriented treatment of animals and posit very different understandings of the moral status of animals.
The ethicist Peter Singer, who was briefly alluded to in Chapter two of this dissertation, sparked a strong growth within the field of animal rights. In 1975, he wrote the book Animal Liberation and made the startling claim that human beings are speciesist when it comes to conferring rights onto Homo sapiens. Concerning a severely retarded human infant, who might not achieve the intelligence of a dog, Singer argues that:
The only thing that distinguishes the infant from the animal, in the eyes of those who claim it has a “right to life,” is that it is, biologically, a member of the species Homo sapiens, whereas chimpanzees, dogs and pigs are not. But to use this difference as the basis for granting a right to life to the infant and not to the other animals is, of course, pure speciesism. It is exactly the kind of arbitrary difference that the most crude and overt kind of racist uses in attempting to justify racial discrimination.[63]
Singer does not argue that if speciesism was rejected it would be ok to choose to kill an adult human who has all his mental faculties instead of say, a dog, if a choice had to be made. Rather he argues that the characteristics that normal human beings have, things such as rationality, a concept of past and future and plans and aspirations furnish them with more of a right to live and to be respected than non-human animals have. Although at first this may seem speciesist, his thinking could lead to the decision to favour an animal over a human being if a choice had to be made. For example, if the decision had to be made to terminate the life of either a severely retarded human infant or a healthy pig, it could be argued that the pig had more ‘human’ characteristics than the infant did and therefore had the greater claim to the right to life. For Singer, animals are also an end in themselves, rather than existing to serve human beings, they should be granted the respect they deserve and be spared of any suffering at human hands.
Although his striving to reduce animal suffering is admirable, Singer’s ethical position is untenable. For most Christians, choosing human life over animal life is not due to speciesism; rather it is due to the belief that human beings are created in God’s image[64] and that human life is sacred because of this reason.
A great proponent of the sanctity of human life was Pope John Paul II who claimed that:
"Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves the creative action of God', and it remains forever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end. God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no one can, in any circumstance, claim for himself the right to destroy directly an innocent human being". With these words the Instruction Donum Vitae sets forth the central content of God's revelation on the sacredness and inviolability of human life.[65]
This passage from the Evangelium Vitae displays how, for many Christians, human life is a sacred thing because of God’s involvement and continued relationship with human beings.
Therefore, considering the above viewpoints, animals should be treated with respect and the infliction of pain and suffering should be avoided as much as is possible.[66] Nevertheless, human beings are different to non-human animals; full-human personhood cannot be extended to them. Certain rights should be granted to non-human animals[67]; however, it is absurd to think that a chimpanzee, for example, should be granted full human rights.[68] However, what about a sophisticated, mature, post-natal human-non-human chimera/hybrid, should human personhood be extended to a being such as this?
Working with the assumptions that were stated at the beginning of this chapter it might be considered prudent to extend the status of full human personhood to a sophisticated, mature, post-natal human-non-human chimera/hybrid. This is a bold statement and will need to be carefully explained.
The key to assessing the moral and ethical status of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids, from a Christian position, lays within the concept of imago Dei that was explored in the last chapter. As was discovered, relationships are of key importance in forming a fully human personhood, both vertical ones with God and horizontal ones with fellow humans. Therefore, if a human-non-human chimera/hybrid had the ability to relate to the divine in someway and could relate to fellow human beings than it could not be denied the acknowledgement that it had human personhood and therefore had all of the rights that accompanies that status.
It appears that the term ‘human being’ has, by virtue of the characteristics required to be considered human, been inexorably associated with the species Homo sapiens. It might be very valid to argue that this is an unfortunate event as it is quite conceivable that human personhood, as defined by imago Dei, is quite capable of transcending specific biological boundaries. If a being displayed ‘human’ characteristics and could conceive of and relate to God in someway, than it would definitely be speciesist to deny that being full ‘human’ personhood and the moral and ethical status that accompanies it. Therefore, if a sophisticated, mature, post-natal human-non-human chimera/hybrid fell under the criteria of imago Dei, it would have to be regarded as a ‘human’ being.
This is a salient point when it comes to debating whether experiments should be undertaken in order to create human-non-human chimeras and hybrids. Although at the moment, as was shown in chapter one, experimentation has currently only occurred at a relatively constrained level; it is conceivable that one day someone might overstep the line and create a human-non-human chimera/hybrid that is allowed to mature and contains a significant percentage of genetic material derived from Homo sapiens. If this was the case, it has been shown that full human personhood and moral status would need to be conferred to the entity if it behaved in a manner fitting a human made in the image of God. Therefore, it would be wise not to undertake experimentation for this reason: creating beings that deserve full human personhood and that in society would probably be viewed as sub-human would be a cruel undertaking. Even if human-non-human chimeras do not progress past very simple post-natal creations it could be considered a violation of the natural order to manipulate and cross genetic material over from non-Homo sapiens to Homo sapiens. Concerning species manipulation Hartman and Ross state that:
[Human] Dominion [over nature] divorced from the balancing concept of stewardship is dangerous, dangerous in the church as it challenges God’s supremacy and dangerous in society as it is idolatrous and dehumanising. [69]
For these reasons, it is difficult to see how the majority of Christians could accept the creation of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids as being an ethical and legitimate area of research.
Conclusion
The questions that were posed at the start of this study were threefold, they were:
- What extent can human-non-human chimeras be considered to be made in the image of God?
- If they contain a significant percentage of human material, what should their moral and ethical status be?
- Finally, according to the Christian point of view, should these entities even be created?
Having looked at the subject areas necessary to answer the questions it would now be pertinent to draw the threads of this dissertation together and come to some conclusions.
Chapter 1 showed that, although the current state of experimentation on human-non-human chimeras and hybrids is in its infancy, it is has been necessary to theorize about a mature, post-natal ‘sophisticated’ human-non-human chimera/hybrid. This is because it is fruitless to try to assess the moral status of a fourteen-day entity, as it is difficult enough in coming to a consensus on the status of pre-fourteen day Homo sapiens. In examining a post-natal mature ‘sophisticated’ blend, it is hoped that the possible consequence of experimenting with human-non-human chimeras and hybrids have been shown.
Chapter 2 explored the concept of imago Dei and showed that human personhood requires human beings to be in relationship with both the divine and fellow human beings; it also showed that the criteria for human personhood might be able to transcend biological frameworks.
The third chapter explored moral and ethical considerations concerning first non-human animals and second human-non-human chimeras and hybrids. It proposed that the term ‘human’ is intertwined with the species Homo sapiens though this does not always have to be the case.
Have these chapters answered the three questions listed above? In answer to the first question, I would argue that human-non-human chimeras and hybrids could be considered to be made in God’s image provided they could relate to God and to other human beings in a way in which non-human animals cannot. Although a chimera/hybrid has not been created that could fulfil this criteria I have looked to a future in which this is a reality in order to help the debate prepare the ground for possible future scenarios in which a sophisticated human-non-human chimera/hybrid is created.
In answering the second question, I would argue that if a human-non-human chimera/hybrid could be said to be made in God’s image than there is no way that they could be denied full ‘human’ personhood. To deny an entity that deserved full human personhood that personhood on grounds of genetic makeup would be pure speciesism.
The answer to the third question should be no. The reason for this is that it in the society in which we live, the public would be very unlikely to recognise human personhood in a being that was not Homo sapiens. It would be a cruel undertaking to create something of dubious moral status and subject it to public prejudice, only confusion and suffering could arise from that situation. Therefore, experimentation in the field of human-non-human chimeras should either be prohibited or at least severely regulated in order that a sophisticated human-non-human chimera/hybrid is never created.
My answers to the questions above and indeed the contents of this whole dissertation are probably very contentious; I feel that this is a good thing, as more theologians need to debate this issue, as it is far from resolved. I hope that further research on the subject of the transcendence of human personhood from specific biological frameworks will be undertaken and that society in general will debate the issues surrounding human-non-human chimeras and hybrids thoroughly.
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[1] http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/03/article_0006.html accessed 05/05/07
[2] I have been very fortunate in being able to ‘shape’ the field of human-non-human chimeras and hybrids a little myself. I have had the opportunity to input into a report titled Embryonic, Fetal and Post-natal Human-Nonhuman Combinations: An Ethical Discussion that is currently being undertaken by the The Centre for Bioethics and Public Policy, which is due to be released in May 2007. In this way, my own understanding of the subject area has been improved, as I have had to reflect deeply on the issue in order to comment on the report.
[5]The classical chimera has the head of a lion, the body of a goat and the tail of a serpent.
[6]SCHB
[8]Embryonic, Fetal [sic] and Post-natal Animal-Human Mixtures: An Ethical Discussion, section 8
[10]New Scientist, The stranger within’, 15/11/03, Issue 2421, p34-37
[11]Ibid p35
[12]Embryonic, Fetal (sic) and Post-natal Animal-Human Mixtures: An Ethical Discussion, section 2
[13]Ibid
[14] The scientific academic community is the best place to find detailed articles and published findings on the experiments carried out so far.
[15]Intracytoplasmic sperm injection
[16]http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmsctech/7/7we23.htm#n195 accessed 09/10/06 N.B- This document claims that this entity is a chimera and not a hybrid.
[17]Ibid
[18]Ibid
[20]http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmsctech/7/7we23.htm#n195 accessed 09/10/06
[23] Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: Proposals for revised legislation (including
establishment of the Regulatory Authority for Tissue and Embryos)
[29] It is evident that the field is continually changing and therefore it is advised that those interested in the debate should visit websites such as the centre for Bioethics and Public Policy’s site: http://www.bioethics.ac.uk/index.php?do=topic&sid=13#intro in order to keep up with the ever-shifting face of the topic.
[31] This statement can be made because the rabbit -human hybrid embryos only contained an extremely small amount of rabbit DNA in the remaining mitochondria of the cytoplasm; therefore, the resulting embryos’ DNA is predominantly human.
[32] Although, in the UK, the Warnock report instigated day fourteen for the cut of point for embryo research, there are many who would argue that a pre-fourteen day embryo can be considered as an individual human being and be ascribed full human status and protection. For example, see Dr A. Sutton’s article ‘Is the human embryo our neighbour?’ Ethics and medicine, 18:3, pp145-154.
[33] Moltmann, 1974, p1
[34] To which many more attributes could be added.
[35] Kallistos Ware in Chirban, J.T (ed.), 1996, p2
[36] Imago Dei is an incredibly vast subject area and there have been a multitude of books written on the subject by a diverse range of people; therefore, it will only be appropriate, in the confines of this study, to construct a model of imago Dei using material very selectively. The material that has been chosen was selected because it had a resonance with me, consequently some readers may hold a very different idea of what represents a valid model of imago Dei. This is not a problem as the nature of the topic is to be subjective; each person that ponders the question ‘what constitutes a human being?’ inevitably brings a different answer to the debate as everybody has a unique viewpoint due to his or her own experiences in life.
[37] Middleton, 2005, p15; it could be argued that imago Dei is less of a doctrine and more of a concept as there are no real set teachings that have been affirmed in creeds or councils. This is an important point as the definition of humanity and personhood must remain flexible and be able to be explored by each generation in order that a genuine and current understanding of imago Dei is maintained.
[38] A third model could be added relating to human beings ‘functional’ attribute; this may be understood as human being’s function as stewards over creation, as mentioned in Genesis 1, containing the image of God. This model will not be explored here, as there is not the space. In addition, it cannot really stand alone from the other two models, as it is only in conjunction with them that it works.
[39] Zizioulas, SJOT, 28:5, p446
[41] Middleton, 2005, p19
[43] This term is not used in a disparaging manner!
[44] Ethics that derive from the Australian ethicist Peter Singer.
[45] Whether Augustine had in mind mentally handicapped people is very debatable, in spite of this the statement can lead modern readers to come to the conclusion that those suffering from mental illnesses who do not have a great reason or intellect still have the image of God in them by virtue of the fact that their soul is always rational.
[46] Indeed many have already been written already; Middleton’s book The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 is a good starting point to explore the issue further. Also Ridley’s book Nature via Nurture: Genes, Experience and what makes us Human, especially Chapter 1, is a good primer on the similarities and differences between humans and animals. Lastly, See Westermann, 1984, pp 147-155 for an overview of Scholarly thought on the topic of the creation of humans in Genesis.
[47] Van Huysteen, T&S, 2005, p168
[48] Barth, 1958, p186
[49] Middleton, 2005, p23
[50] See Heffner’s chapter ‘Imago Dei: The Possibility and Necessity of the Human Person’ in Gregerson et al, Pp 86-87
[51] For an in depth look at the trinity, esp. relating to personhood, see P. M. Collins, 2001, chap. 5
[52] ‘As the [divine] Persons are what they are only through their relations with the others, it must also be the case that their identities are formed through the others and the ways in which the others relate to them.’ (Mcfadyen cited in Collins, 2001, p142)
[54] Coming from a ‘mainstream’ Christian viewpoint.
[55] Wells, p103
[56] This need not necessarily be spoken.
[57] Kant, ‘Duties towards animals’ in Kuhse & Singer, pp564
[58] Ibid, p565
[59] Ibid
[60] See Leahy, p198
[61] Ibid
[62] Ibid
[63] Singer, 1995, p18
[64] For the reasons discussed in Chapter 2.
[65] Evangelium Vitae §53, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html accessed 04/05/07
[66] However, if animal suffering is a truly unavoidable consequence of really contributing to humankind it should be cautiously permitted. For example if a cure for a human disease required the experimentation upon animals, provided there was no real alternative and provided that the results would help advance the discovery of a cure, animals should be used in the research.
[67] For example, the right not to have unnecessary suffering inflicted by humans.
[68] This is being proposed in Austria
